



THE YEMEN TREND

December
2018



RESEARCH . ANALYSIS . ADVISORY

The Yemen Trend is a monthly digest that highlights Yemen's key economic and humanitarian trends and political and military developments, providing context and analysis where necessary in order to facilitate informed discussion deeply rooted in the facts.

Executive Overview

The resumption of the UN-sponsored peace process in December has presented the warring parties with a path toward alleviating the suffering in Yemen, which multiple reports show has worsened considerably throughout 2018. The latest Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) findings show for the first time that tens of thousands of Yemenis are classified in IPC Phase 5, known as Famine or Catastrophe, and a total 15.9 million people are severely food insecure. The total number of Yemenis requiring some form of humanitarian assistance in the new year, according to the Global Humanitarian Overview 2019, is 24 million – 80 percent of the population.

UN Envoy Martin Griffiths convened the Yemeni delegations in Sweden from December 6 to 13, which culminated in the Stockholm Agreement. The warring parties agreed to a ceasefire and a mutual redeployment of forces from the city and ports of Hodeidah; to exchange all prisoners; to form a joint committee to continue negotiations over de-escalation in Taiz; and to resume national consultations unconditionally in January. The ceasefire went into effect in Hodeidah governorate on December 18, and the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2451 (2018) on December 21, which endorses the Stockholm Agreement and authorizes a UN monitoring team to oversee the redeployment in Hodeidah.

The Houthis ceremonially and unilaterally announced the transfer of the port to a local unit of the coast guard on December 29. However, the Hadi government said the Houthis' handover to authorities under their own control violates the agreement reached in Sweden. This set the stage for the central issue in January to be over the phrasing of the Hodeidah agreement, which states ambiguously that the city and ports of Hodeidah “shall be the responsibility of local security forces in accordance with Yemeni law.”

Timeline

- Dec 06 UN-sponsored consultations begin in Sweden, prisoner exchange deal announced at outset
- Dec 09 Saudi Arabia delivers cranes to be installed in Aden and Mukalla ports
- Dec 11 Warring parties hand over lists of ~16,000 names as first step in POW exchange deal
- Dec 13 Sweden Consultations conclude with announcement of Stockholm Agreement
- Dec 13 Senate votes in favor of ending US military participation in the conflict
- Dec 18 Hodeidah ceasefire goes into effect as part of deal reached in Sweden
- Dec 21 Security Council adopts Resolution 2451 (2018), authorizes deployment of monitors to Hodeidah
- Dec 26 UN-chaired Redeployment & Coordination Committee convenes in Hodeidah city
- Dec 29 Humanitarian convoy scheduled to travel from Hodeidah to Sana'a blocked; Houthis blamed
- Dec 29 Houthis hand Hodeidah port to own coast guard, move rejected by Hadi government

Humanitarian and Economic Trends

IPC Phase 5 Famine has been documented for the first time in Yemen, according to the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) report. The December 7 [report](#) says that 63,500 Yemenis are classified in Phase 5, which is also referred to as Catastrophe. A total of 15.9 million people – 53 percent of the population – are suffering from “severe” food insecurity, which refers to those categorized in IPC phases 3 to 5. Without humanitarian food assistance

(HFA), the report warns, 20.1 million Yemenis would be facing severe food insecurity and 238,000 would be facing Famine/Catastrophe (see figure below). The research was conducted by a consortium of agencies coordinated overall by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, and UN Relief Chief Mark Lowcock [referred](#) to the report as “the most detailed, rigorous food security survey ever conducted in the country.”

December 2018 – January 2019 (with HFA)			December 2018 – January 2019 (without HFA)		
<p>15.9 M 53% of the population</p> <p>People facing severe acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+) DESPITE ONGOING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE</p>	Phase 5	63 500 People in Catastrophe	<p>20.1 M 67% of the population</p> <p>People facing severe acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+) WITHOUT HUMANITARIAN FOOD ASSISTANCE</p>	Phase 5	238 000 People in Catastrophe
	Phase 4	4 957 000 People in Emergency		Phase 4	9 647 000 People in Emergency
	Phase 3	10 879 500 People in Crisis		Phase 3	10 239 000 People in Crisis
	Phase 2	8 875 000 People in Stress		Phase 2	6 323 000 People in Stress
	Phase 1	5 109 500 People minimally food insecure		Phase 1	3 437 000 People minimally food insecure

Source: [IPC December 7 report](#)

The IPC report notes that “the large food gaps are only marginally mitigated by HFA which is not adequate to reverse the continuous deterioration of the situation.” It states that the main driver of the food insecurity is armed conflict, exacerbated further by “extremely high food prices, the liquidity crisis, disrupted livelihoods, and high levels of unemployment.” The report further notes that livelihood support has been extremely limited, as only 1.4 million people were reached with livelihood support between January and October 2018, out of 5.7 million targeted and 17 million food insecure.

No formal declaration of famine

Globally, the majority of individuals classified in IPC Phase 5 Famine/Catastrophe are now Yemeni. However, the IPC technical working group on Yemen did not make a formal declaration of famine in the December report, as it did most recently in South Sudan. The February 2017 [Famine Declaration](#) for that country was made when 100,000 South Sudanese were categorized in IPC Phase 5 and an estimated 5 million people were in IPC phases 3 to 5 (severely food insecure). Yemen, with a little over twice the population, in comparison has nearly 65,000 people in Phase 5 spread over a larger geographic expanse, and a staggering 15.9 million severely food insecure.

UNICEF, in reference to the IPC report, [said](#) that “famine is declared when there is evidence of the following three conditions in a single location: at least 20 percent of households face extreme food shortages; at least 30 percent of children younger than five suffer from acute malnutrition; and at least two out of every 10,000 people are dying every day. The analysis for Yemen does not meet this threshold at present.” The December report notes a “lack of district level nutrition and mortality data has significantly hampered the convergence of evidence process at the unit of analysis.”

Nearly 80 percent of Yemenis require humanitarian assistance in 2019. According to the [Global Humanitarian Overview 2019](#) produced by OCHA, the situation has deteriorated throughout 2018 and 24 million people are in need of one or more forms of humanitarian relief. Of this number, humanitarian organizations are aiming to reach 15 million people in 2019, which is 39 percent more than 2018, OCHA said. Of these, 14 million are in acute need. This marks an increase from [22.2 million](#) people requiring assistance in 2018.

The WFP demanded the Houthis put a stop to the diversion of food relief. In a [press release](#) on December 31, the World Food Programme said it has collected evidence of food being illicitly removed from designated food distribution centers, local officials manipulating beneficiary lists and falsifying records, and a local organization affiliated with the Sana'a-based Ministry of Education fraudulently handling and distributing food assistance provided by the WFP. "I'm asking the Houthi authorities in Sana'a to take immediate action to end the diversion of food assistance and ensure that it reaches those people who rely on it to stay alive," WFP Executive Director David Beasley said. "Unless this happens, we'll have no option but to cease working with those who've been conspiring to deprive large numbers of vulnerable people of the food on which they depend."

The Associated Press [reported](#) that Beasley sent a letter to Houthi leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, saying that only 40 percent of the eligible beneficiaries in Sana'a are being reached. "If you don't act within 10 days, WFP will have no choice but to suspend the assistance... that goes to nearly 3 million people," AP quoted the letter as saying. In [response](#) to the allegations, the Houthis "welcomed" an investigation into the issue but at the same time accused the UN body of subordination to foreign political interests and alleged that it shipped rotten food to Yemen.

Humanitarian access remains severely limited in Hodeidah, despite the ceasefire. As part of the Hodeidah agreement struck in Sweden (see following sections), a humanitarian convoy was scheduled to travel on December 29 from Hodeidah city to Sana'a via the Kilo 16 route, which is blocked on the outskirts of the city. An IED-defusal operation was conducted along the route, but the convoy did not pass through. "The opening of the Hodeidah-Sana'a highway as a humanitarian corridor to deliver humanitarian assistance, as agreed during the first joint meeting of

the Redeployment Coordination Committee, did not take place today," the UN [announced](#) on the 29th. "While the Government of Yemen was purportedly ready to support the movement of a humanitarian convoy that day, the Houthis were not," reads the Secretary-General's progress [report](#) to the Security Council.

Meanwhile, the vital Red Sea Mills in Hodeidah city remained inaccessible in December. "Access to the mills has been impossible since fighting escalated around them in September," UN relief chief Lowcock [said](#) in his mid-December briefing. "Fighters have regularly impinged upon the compound, and the site was repeatedly struck by mortar fire." Despite coming under the control of anti-Houthi forces in November, Lowcock said access continues to be hampered due to difficulties crossing the front lines and concerns the area could be mined. "Because of all this, enough food to feed 3.5 million people for a month has now sat useless in a warehouse for more than three months," he said, adding that there are many other mills, silos, and warehouses in and around Hodeidah city that are in danger of being damaged by fighting.

Yemen witnessed a 50 percent jump in migrant arrivals over the last year. Nearly 150,000 migrants are estimated to have arrived in Yemen in 2018, [according](#) to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), up from around 100,000 the previous year. Around 92 percent of the migrants are Ethiopian and the remainder Somali. Despite the ongoing war in Yemen and risks to movement in the horn of Africa, the UN agency noted that this migrant transit route was even busier than the route to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea, taken by around 107,000 migrants in 2018. A spokesman for IOM [said](#) the conflict and instability in Yemen are actually being used "as marketing points" for human smugglers, who tell the migrants their voyage to the wealthy Gulf states will be easier because Yemeni authorities are preoccupied dealing with the war.

The UN relief chief reiterated his call for the removal of fuel import restrictions. In his December 14 [briefing](#) to the Security Council, Mark Lowcock commended the Hadi government for removing in November the food import restrictions made as part of Cabinet Decree No. 75, but said "we also continue to call on the Government to lift restrictions on fuel imports, which are needed to power hospital generators, to keep water networks running and for other critical tasks across the country." He said the

Political Developments

restrictions were currently blocking over 70,000 tons of fuel from entering the port of Hodeidah. “I had a constructive discussion with the Prime Minister on that, and I hope to see positive action soon,” he added. Earlier in the month, OCHA said via its [commodity tracker](#) that as a result of Decree No. 75, “six vessels carrying 71,517 metric tons of fuel are being denied permission by EHOc, at the request of the GoY.”

For its part, the Economic Committee in charge of implementing Decree No. 75 and approving import requests says it is not denying permits to any importers so long as they submit the required documentation. According to the committee, between October 18 and December 13 it approved 39 of a total 44 applications (89 percent), and importers who have not been approved are able to re-apply after meeting the criteria. The committee further noted the number of requests increased markedly in December compared to the previous months, and included “all the major traders and a large part of the new traders in all the liberated and unliberated governorates.” Noting that Hodeidah had the largest share per port of approved petroleum products, the Economic Committee said this “confirms the baselessness of the allegation that bureaucratic procedures affected the entry of oil products or food to citizens in the unliberated areas.”

See the [November 2018 issue](#) of the Yemen Trend for background details on the Economic Committee and Decree No. 75.

Saudi Arabia delivered cranes to Aden and Mukalla ports. The cranes, delivered on December 9, were provided through the coalition’s Yemen Comprehensive Humanitarian Operations Support Center. Two cranes are to be installed in Aden port, and one in Mukalla, [according](#) to Saudi media. The Saudi government also [continued](#) its monthly shipment of around \$60 million worth of oil derivatives to southern Yemen, primarily the port of Aden, for distribution by the Aden Refinery Company to electricity plants in areas throughout Yemen controlled by the Hadi government and coalition.

The UN-sponsored Sweden Consultations were held from December 6 to 13, the first time in over two years the warring parties formally convened to negotiate. Prior to the consultations, UN Envoy Martin Griffiths flew to Sana’a on December 3, the same day that [50 injured](#) Yemenis selected by the Houthis were flown to Muscat for medical treatment as a confidence building measure. Griffiths then travelled from Sana’a to Sweden with the delegation of the de-facto authorities in Sana’a. On December 6, the day the consultations opened, Griffiths [told](#) the New York Times he hopes that “by the end of this round, the Yemeni parties will agree on the outline of an eventual comprehensive agreement, which will then be submitted to the United Nations secretary general and then to the Security Council for endorsement. I hope it will become a public road map to peace.” Six core issues were examined during the consultations:

- A comprehensive exchange of prisoners and detainees
- The military situation in Hodeidah & administration of the port
- The issue of road access and a potential ceasefire in Taiz
- The framework for the comprehensive agreement
- Economic confidence-building measures
- Reopening Sana’a airport to commercial flights

On the first day of the consultations, Griffiths announced a long-anticipated prisoner exchange deal had been struck, which he called the first formal agreement between the warring parties since the conflict began. On December 13, the last day of the consultations, Griffiths announced the [Stockholm Agreement](#), which includes three key points:

1. An agreement on the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa.
2. An executive mechanism on activating the prisoner exchange agreement.
3. A statement of understanding on Taiz.

Furthermore, the parties agreed to continue consultations “unconditionally” in January, in a location to be agreed upon. More information on the issues of a prisoner exchange, Hodeidah city and port, and Sana’a airport are examined in more detail later in this report, while the implementation of the statement of understanding on Taiz is expected to begin in January.

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2451 (2018) on December 21, which endorses the Stockholm Agreement and authorizes the deployment of a monitoring team to Hodeidah (see next section). Through [Resolution 2451 \(2018\)](#), adopted unanimously by the 15 member states, the UNSC furthermore “*Calls on the Government of Yemen and the Houthis to remove bureaucratic impediments to flows of commercial and humanitarian supplies, including fuel, and on the parties to ensure effective and sustained functioning of all of Yemen’s ports, onward road access throughout the country, and the reopening and safe and secure operation of Sana’a airport for commercial flights within an agreed mechanism.*” It also “*calls on the parties to work with the Special Envoy to strengthen the economy and the functioning of the Central Bank of Yemen and to deliver payment of pensioners and civil servant salaries.*”

The humanitarian elements in the resolution were toned down following criticism from the US and its Gulf allies. The Guardian [reported](#) that “the US stunned the UK and other European missions by threatening to veto the British resolution if the humanitarian language was not pruned and a clause inserted explicitly condemning Iran for its role as a backer of the Houthi rebels – an insertion that was blocked by Russia.” As with US efforts that successfully prevented a Security Council resolution in November, diplomats voiced the opinion that the US is prioritizing its relationship with Saudi Arabia over its European allies.

The prisoner exchange deal is moving forward, with 16,000 names handed over. “Today, I’m also pleased to announce the signing of an agreement on the exchange of prisoners, detainees, the missing, the forcibly detained and individuals placed under house arrest,” Griffiths said in his [speech](#) to open the Sweden Consultations. That same day the ICRC [welcomed](#) the agreement, saying it will provide technical support and play a role as a neutral intermediary. On December 11, the warring parties’ representatives [shook hands](#) following the formal exchange of more than 16,000 names. On December 17, the UN envoy made public a copy of [the agreement](#), which lays out the mechanism for the transfer of all prisoners. The ICRC [said](#) that 40 days after the December 11 signing, it will have 10 days to privately interview each detained individual, and then the releases will begin.

The Houthis objected to opening Sana’a Airport for screened domestic flights, after the Hadi government delegation proposed commercial flights be allowed between Sana’a and Aden or Seyoun. “We are ready to reopen Sana’a international airport today... but we have a vision that Aden will be the sovereign airport of Yemen,” Foreign Minister Khaled Al-Yemani, who led the government delegation, [said](#) during the consultations. The proposal, which would have Sana’a-bound flights inspected at either of the Hadi-controlled airports, was immediately [rejected](#) by the Houthi delegation, which demanded direct international flights to Sana’a resume.

Military and Security Developments

The parties agreed to redeploy their forces outside the ports and city of Hodeidah. As part of the Stockholm Agreement announced on December 13, the warring parties signed the [Agreement on the City of Hodeidah and Ports of Hodeidah, Salif, and Ras Isa](#) (details in box below). Fighting [continued](#) in Hodeidah after the agreement was reached at the conclusion of the Sweden Consultations, and Griffiths [announced](#) the ceasefire would go into effect at 00:00 on December 18. Since then, hundreds of violations were alleged by both warring parties, and some clashes were [reported](#) in and around Hodeidah city following the ceasefire, but the ceasefire largely took hold and the implementation began.

Key points in the Hodeidah agreement

The parties agree:

- To a ceasefire in all areas of the governorate;
- To a “mutual redeployment of forces” and the removal of “military manifestations” to outside the city and ports. This is to happen in phases: first the combatants should redeploy “from critical parts of the city associated with the humanitarian facilities” within two weeks from the ceasefire, and within another week from the city and ports entirely;
- To refrain from sending reinforcements into the governorate;
- To form a joint Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) chaired by the UN to facilitate the implementation;

- That security in the city and ports “shall be the responsibility of local security forces in accordance with Yemen law;” and
- That the UN is to have a leading role in supporting the Yemen Red Sea Ports Corporation manage port operations, and revenues from the three ports in the governorate are to be channelled through the Hodeidah branch of the Central Bank of Yemen “as a contribution to the payment of salaries in the governorate of Hodeidah and throughout Yemen.”

On December 27, President Hadi [announced](#) that salaries would be paid to employees in Hodeidah. The next day, Supreme Revolutionary Committee head Mohammed Al-Houthi [demanded](#) that all state employees be paid nationwide, and paying only those in Hodeidah was an attempt to circumvent the Hodeidah agreement.

The Redeployment and Coordination Committee convened in Hodeidah. General Cammaert [arrived](#) in Hodeidah with his advance team on December 23, after having met with either sides’ representatives in Aden and then Sana’a during the preceding days. On December 24 the UN ceasefire monitoring chief and his team [toured](#) the city to inspect the frontlines and access routes. On December 26 the Hadi government representatives crossed the frontline into the Houthi-held part of the city, and the RCC [held](#) its first joint meeting. [According](#) to UN News, the RCC members held three days of meetings (26-28), following the ceasefire which formally started on December 18. Their work is reportedly focused on three priorities: “maintaining the ceasefire, confidence-building measures to deliver humanitarian assistance, and redeployment of fighters.”

Background on the RCC

The Redeployment and Coordination Committee is composed of military and security representatives from both warring parties, and the UN chair of the body is retired Major General Patrick Cammaert. In his December 14 [briefing](#) Griffiths asked the Security Council for its backing in the implementation of the Hodeidah agreement. In the aforementioned [Resolution 2451 \(2018\)](#) passed on December 21, the Security Council stated it “Authorises the Secretary-General to establish and deploy, for an ini-

tial period of 30 days from the adoption of this resolution, an advance team to begin monitoring and to support and facilitate the immediate implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, including the request for the United Nations to chair the Redeployment Coordination Committee and to update the Council within one week.”

Redeployment began, but disagreement arose over which body is authorized to secure the city and ports. On December 29, the Houthis [announced](#) the first redeployment of fighters. In the presence of General Cammaert and the Houthi-appointed acting governor of Hodeidah, Mohammed Quhaim, the group announced the transfer of authority over the port to the portion of the Yemeni coast guard under its control. Houthi fighters dressed in street clothes were then [pictured](#) leaving the port to uniformed coast guard personnel. Acting Houthi-appointed governor Quhaim [said](#) the local units of the coast guard were responsible for protecting the ports prior to the conflict. Askar Zaeel, a member of the delegation to the Sweden Consultations, [said](#) this move by the Houthis represents a negative start to the implementation of the agreement and demanded that the port and city be handed over to bodies of the official government.

“In lieu of preparations for the confidence-building measures, the Houthi representatives to the Committee informed the Chair of unilateral redeployment measures taken at the Hodeidah port and invited the United Nations to inspect the redeployment,” the UN Secretary-General’s progress [report](#) to the Security Council clarifies. “While the Chair welcomed that effort, he emphasized that any redeployment would only be credible if it were conducted in consonance with mutually agreed modalities and if both parties and the United Nations were able to monitor the process and ascertain that it was in accordance with the Stockholm Agreement.”

Hostilities remained intense at several frontlines nationwide, and increased in Serwah. With the exception of Hodeidah governorate, the intensified ground fighting at several fronts nationwide that began at the beginning of November continued through December. In Serwah district the Houthis captured several strategic mountains shortly after the Sweden Consultations ended, and [claimed](#) to have taken 90 percent of the district under their control. Though the claims were exaggerated, the Houthi advance marked

the first notable shift on the ground at that front in nearly a year. By the end of December most of the captured territory was retaken by the Hadi military, with the support of coalition airstrikes.

In addition to the longstanding fronts in Hajjah and Sa'ada governorates, the fighting at the Damt front in northern Al-Dhale'a governorate remained intense, and the UNHCR [reported](#) that around 12,500 people have had to flee due to the fighting there. "Reports indicate that some of the displaced families are living in caves, and almost all of them are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection," the UN agency said.

Child soldiers are being sent to the front lines by both warring parties. [Reporting](#) by the Associated Press indicates the Houthis have brought as many as 18,000 child soldiers into their ranks since 2014. Based on interviews with over a dozen former child soldiers, the AP found that the Houthis have conducted a well-organized recruitment campaign, especially in schools, and that many of the children are sent to training camps by force. The children first go through a month-long religious and ideological indoctrination in "culture centers," which espouse the views of the late Houthi leader Hussein Badr Al-Deen Al-Houthi, before undergoing military training in the mountains. The Houthis are believed to use child soldiers more extensively than their opponents.

Meanwhile, a New York Times [investigation](#) found that the coalition is deploying Sudanese child soldiers to the frontlines along the west coast. The children are members of the Rapid Support Forces, a Sudanese paramilitary previously known as the Janjaweed militia, which is accused of war crimes in Darfur. According to the Times, all those interviewed said they were fighting solely for financial incentives, paid directly to the fighters by Saudi Arabia, and that the Saudis and Emiratis would command them "almost exclusively" by radio headsets and GPS systems in order to remain at a safe distance from the frontline.

Over 60,000 fatalities have been caused by conflict-related violence in under two years, according to new [estimates](#) by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). A total of 60,233 conflict fatalities were recorded between January 2016 and November 2018, and the intensity of the fighting in Hodeidah is apparent: Of these fatalities, the number recorded in 2018 is 68 percent higher than 2017, and 37 percent of the total number of civilians

killed in 2018 have died in Hodeidah. Relatedly, the Protection Cluster [said](#) in December that there were up to 1,460 civilian casualties in Hodeidah governorate in the previous month, and the UN envoy [said](#) that "since June, the population of the city has dwindled to 150,000, during months of severe fighting."

The Senate voted 56 to 41 in favor of ending US military participation in the conflict. The December 13 vote marked the first time in 45 years that the Vietnam-era War Powers Resolution has been invoked. The resolution asserts "that the constitutional responsibility for making war rests with the United States Congress, not the White House," Independent Senator Bernie Sanders [said](#). However, the bill is unlikely to become law because it requires endorsement from the House, currently controlled by the Republican Party, and then a two-thirds majority in both the House and Senate would be required to overturn an anticipated veto by President Trump, whose administration has strongly opposed the effort.

Relatedly, amid pressure and a souring of relations between the US congress and Saudi Arabia, the US Defense Department [admitted](#) Saudi Arabia and the UAE collectively were not billed for \$331 million in fuel and servicing costs for refueling by the US military. The costs – \$36.8 million for fuel and \$249.3 million for US flight hours – were never billed to the coalition partners, and the Pentagon said the Saudi government never made any payments for those services. A week prior, the Atlantic had [quoted](#) a defense department spokesperson as saying "US Central Command recently reviewed its records and found errors in accounting where DoD failed to charge the SLC adequately for fuel and refueling services."

Recommended reading and viewing:

Journalistic articles

- Based on dozens of interviews, including former detainees, Maggie Michael of the Associated Press writes in detail about the [Torture rife in prisons run by Yemen rebels](#). (Supreme Revolutionary Council head Mohammed Al-Houthi [called](#) for an investigation in response to this AP investigation).
- Through the eyes of some of the leading paramilitary and political figures in southern Yemen, Ghaith Abdul-Ahad writes for the Guardian about [how the UAE is profiting from the chaos of civil war](#) in Yemen.
- A long-form article by the New York Times tell [The Journey of an American Bomb](#), from Arizona to Yemen.
- A short story about [How free breakfast brought 500 girls back to school in Yemen](#).

Longer reports

- In a publication produced jointly by seven leading local human rights and women's NGOs, [Yemeni Women Map the Road to Peace](#). Relatedly, an [opinion piece](#) published by Reuters argues that "Including women at the peace table is not just a matter of fairness – it is a strategic imperative."
- The John Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health released the results of [A Case Study of Epidemic Preparedness and Response](#) to the cholera crisis in Yemen. The detailed report covers lessons learned from the initial outbreak in 2016 to the end of the second phase in March 2018 and offers recommendations for how to better prepare for future cholera outbreaks.



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